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SOUR CHOCOLATE: THE U.K. TAKEOVER PANEL’S
IMPROPER REACTION TO KRAFT’S ACQUISITION OF
CADBURY
Michael R. Patrone*

Abstract
This article critiques the U.K. Takeover Panel Code Committee’s
proposals to amend the U.K. Takeover Code in response to Kraft’s
acquisition of Cadbury, on the premise that well-founded takeover law
and regulation should focus on fair process and leave socioeconomic
factors and foreign investment regulation to other areas of the law. After
outlining the United Kingdom’s takeover regime and the Takeover
Panel’s review of the Takeover Code, this article offers a critique of two
specific proposed reforms contained in the Takeover Panel Report. This
article then questions the effectiveness of the regime under the Takeover
Panel Report’s proposals and introduces an alternative approach to
fulfilling the Takeover Panel’s goals that the Panel missed. This article
concludes by calling for additional research to determine the proper
course and proposals the Panel should take.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

The international, cross-border merger boom has not been without
social and political consequences. Cadbury/Kraft, a $19 billion hostileturned-friendly takeover in 2010, illustrated sound execution of the
United Kingdom’s board neutrality regime but tested a nation’s resolve
of its underlying policies. Kraft’s pursuit of Cadbury was public and
drawn-out, dating back to August 2009 when Cadbury management first
received, and dismissed, a merger proposal from Kraft.1 The ensuing
battle did not result in a formal bid until November 2009 and involved:
(1) numerous outside parties, including the U.K. Panel on Takeovers and
Mergers (Takeover Panel), Nestle, Hershey’s, and investor Warren
Buffett,2 and (2) a mandatory bid-or-walk-away order from the Takeover
Panel.3 Cadbury shareholders, aided by short-term investors,
arbitrageurs, and hedge funds that purchased shares after Kraft
announced its initial interest in Cadbury, ultimately decided that the deal
for the chocolate manufacturer was too sweet to pass up despite the
Cadbury Board’s opinion that the offer price was too low.4 Rather than
succumb to the hostile bid, the Cadbury Board revised its position and
negotiated a friendly sale to Kraft, agreed to Kraft’s revised proposal in
January 2010, and recommended that shareholders vote for the deal.5
In the months that followed the American company’s acquisition of
the 186-year-old British icon, Kraft reversed its stance against closing
Cadbury plants in the United Kingdom and announced that it would
close the Somerdale chocolate plant in Keynsham, despite widespread
public protests and resistance from U.K. regulators.6 During the
acquisition process, critics of the acquisition frequently cited Cadbury
job losses as a likely outcome of the deal, but Kraft executives deflected
these concerns during the bidding period and reiterated the company’s
1
David Jones, TIMELINE—Kraft Agrees Cadbury Deal After 4-month Fight, REUTERS, Jan.
19, 2010, http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/01/19/cadbury-kraft-idUSLDE60E0XI20 100119.
2
Id.; see also AP, Warren Buffet Opposed Kraft-Cadbury Merger, WASH. POST, Jan. 6, 2010,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/01/05/AR201001050
3860.html
(discussing Berkshire Hathaway’s, Warren Buffet’s investment group, opinion on Kraft’s purchase
of Cadbury).
3
AP, supra note 2. A mandatory bid-or-walk-away deadline, also called a “put up or shut up”
deadline, is a provision that was added to the Takeover Code in 2004 and designed to protect U.K.
companies from prolonged siege and extended “virtual bid periods.” Under this approach, a bidder
must submit a formal bid within twenty-eight days of formally announcing an intention to make an
offer for a target company. If the bidder has not yet made a formal announcement, the target
company can request that the Takeover Panel implement a “put up or shut up” period that begins the
twenty-eight day time period. See The Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, The Takeover Code r. 2.4,
Mar. 30, 2009 (U.K.) [hereinafter Takeover Code]. The current version of the Takeover Code is
available at http://www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk (follow “Download Code as PDF” hyperlink).
4
Michael J. de la Merced & Chris V. Nicholson, Kraft to Acquire Cadbury in Deal Worth $19
Billion, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2010, https://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/20/business/
global/20kraft.html.
5
Id.
6
Cecile Rohwedder & Alistair MacDonald, Kraft Faces Probe on Cadbury, WALL ST. J., Mar.
8, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405274870391520457510400210 0336526.html
(citing Kraft’s intent to move the Keynsham plant). Contra de la Merced & Nicholson, supra note 4
(quoting Kraft executives that it would be a “net importer” of jobs into the United Kingdom).
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stance on increasing jobs in the United Kingdom.7 After the sale, Kraft
announced that it would shift the manufacturing activities of this plant to
Poland. This announcement further angered the local workforce and
labor unions and provoked a growing sense of economic nationalism.8
This decision prompted the Takeover Panel to investigate whether Kraft
misled investors.9 Since the Takeover Panel can only levy private and
public reprimands, the investigation was not a true threat to Kraft.10
Facing mounting public pressure and backlash from Cadbury’s
acquisition, in February 2010, the Takeover Panel commenced a review
of the City Code on Takeovers and Mergers (Takeover Code) with
particular focus on the regulations that govern the unsolicited takeovers
of U.K. companies. The Takeover Panel cited Kraft’s takeover of
Cadbury and public comments made by former Cadbury chairman Roger
Carr urging changes as reasons for the review.11 The Takeover Panel
released a lengthy consultation paper on June 1, 2010, entitled
“Consultation Paper Issued by the Code Committee of the Panel: Review
of Certain Aspects of the Regulation of Takeover Bids” (Consultation
Paper), and invited comments regarding potential changes to the
Takeover Code.12 After receiving public feedback from nearly 100
sources, the Takeover Panel Code Committee (Code Committee)13 issued
a report entitled “The Takeover Panel Code Committee Review of
Certain Aspects of the Regulation of Takeover Bids” (Takeover Panel
Report) on October 21, 2010—just nine months after Cadbury signed its
agreement with Kraft.14 While the Takeover Panel Report does not
specifically mention the Cadbury/Kraft acquisition, its tone is deliberate
that the Takeover Panel does not want another British icon to go the way
of Cadbury and places a newfound emphasis on non-shareholder
constituencies in the hostile bidding and takeover context.15
7

See sources cited supra note 6.
See Jonathan Petre, The Last Curly Wurly in Britain: End of the Line for Cadbury Factory
that
Kraft
Vowed
to
Keep
Open,
THE
DAILY
MAIL,
Jan.
2,
2011,
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1343391/Somerdale-Cadbury-plant-End-line-factory-Kraftvowed-open.html.
9
Zoe Wood, Takeover Panel to Look into Kraft’s Closure of Cadbury Factory, THE
GUARDIAN, Mar. 8, 2010, http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2010/mar/08/kraft-cadbury-closuretakeover-panel.
10
Takeover Code, supra note 3, at § A(11)(b); THE TAKEOVER PANEL CODE COMMITTEE,
REVIEW OF CERTAIN ASPECTS OF THE REGULATION OF TAKEOVER BIDS, 2010, Consultation Paper
Issued by the Code Committee of the Panel PCP 2010/2, 1, [hereinafter CONSULTATION PAPER],
http://www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2008/11/ PCP201002.pdf.
11
CONSULTATION PAPER, supra note 10, at 1–2.
12
Id. at 2.
13
The Code Committee, one of the Takeover Panel’s two committees, is charged with the
Takeover Panel’s rulemaking functions. Takeover Code, supra note 3, at § A(4)(b).
14
THE TAKEOVER PANEL CODE COMMITTEE, REVIEW OF CERTAIN ASPECTS OF THE
REGULATION OF TAKEOVER BIDS 1–2 (2010) [hereinafter TAKEOVER PANEL REPORT] available at
http://www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2008/11/2010-22.pdf; see also Jessica
Hodgson & Dana Cimilluca, U.K. to Overhaul Merger Rules, WALL ST. J., Oct. 21, 2010, available
at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240527023040238045755
65712776857050.html
(reporting the details of the Takover Panel Report).
15
TAKEOVER PANEL REPORT, supra note 14, at 3. Cf. CONSULTATION PAPER, supra note 10, at
1 (referencing the Cadbury/Kraft merger and the widespread public debate that followed).
8
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Major events often cause substantial legal reforms,16 but the public
policy driving proposed revisions in the law should be unbiased and
sound. This article will critique the proposals contained in the Takeover
Panel Report on the premise that well-founded takeover law and
regulation should focus on fair process and leave socioeconomic factors
and foreign investment regulation to other areas of the law.17 After
outlining the United Kingdom’s takeover regime and the Takeover
Panel’s review, this article will critique two specific proposed reforms
contained in the Takeover Panel Report, and will point out an alternative
proposal the Takeover Panel missed that could better satisfy its goals.18
This article will conclude by calling for additional research.
II.

THE EVOLVING U.K. TAKEOVER REGIME

The Takeover Code, first introduced in 1968, is a collection of
mandatory rules governing companies that are listed on national stock
exchanges in the United Kingdom and have their registered offices in the
United Kingdom.19 The Takeover Code’s mission is to ensure fair
treatment of shareholders and promote integrity in the financial
markets.20 The Takeover Code focuses on accurate and sufficient
disclosure of information to shareholders so that they may decide on the
merits of a takeover, and on equal and fair treatment of all shareholders
in takeovers.21 Additionally, the Takeover Code places certain
restrictions on company boards so that they may not interfere with
shareholders considering the merits of a takeover proposal or undertake
actions that would frustrate meaningful shareholder choice.22 The
Takeover Code, however, is not concerned with the business, strategic,
or financial benefits or risks of takeovers and expressly states that these
benefits and risks are to be judged by target companies and their
shareholders.23 Further, the Takeover Code disclaims any position on
antitrust or competition matters.24
The United Kingdom has long been a leading proponent of open
markets, company neutrality, and shareholder empowerment in the face
of hostile bids.25 To understand the effect of this regime, consider the

16
See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 111–203,
124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered titles of the U.S.C.).
17
Michael R. Patrone, An International Comparison of Corporate Leeway to Ward-Off
Predators, 25 BUTTERWORTHS J. INT’L BANKING & FIN. LAW 355, 358 (2010), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1743845.
18
There are several other proposed changes that merit analysis and review, but the length of
this article requires a narrower scope.
19
Takeover Code, supra note 3, § A(3)(a).
20
Id. § A(2)(a).
21
Id.
22
E.g., id. at r. 21.
23
Id. § A(2)(a).
24
Id.
25
See generally Companies Act, (2006), Vol. 3 CURRENT LAW 1, (U.K.); Companies Act,
(1985), Vol. 1 Current Law 1, (U.K.).
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U.S. merger boom of the 1980s.26 With the advent of junk bond
financing and creative schemes like two-tier, front-end loaded tender
offers,27 hostile bidders could take over target companies with futile
resistance by economically coercing the target’s shareholders into
quickly tendering their shares.28 This approach was a method of choice
for raiders in the United States, where the only real obstacle was the
limited federal protection of the Williams Act—requiring tender offers to
be held open for twenty days.29 Before the shareholder rights plan,
dubbed the “poison pill,” U.S. companies and shareholders were at the
mercy of hostile acquirers.30
Shareholders in the United Kingdom, however, did not face this
dilemma. Under the Takeover Code, which applies to all listed
companies headquartered in the United Kingdom, two-tier tender offers
are prohibited.31 Additionally, under mandatory bidding requirements, a
shareholder must bid for all of the target’s shares once he or she obtains
control.32 Unlike other jurisdictions, company control in the United
Kingdom is met at a much lower threshold for regulatory purposes, and
is defined in the Takeover Code as “an interest, or interests, in shares
carrying in aggregate 30% or more of the voting right . . . of a company,
irrespective of whether such interest or interests allow de facto
control.”33 The United Kingdom incorporated these provisions into the
Companies Act of 1985, and retained them in the U.K. Companies Act of
2006 that officially gave the Takeover Code a statutory basis.34 The
Takeover Code still contains these provisions today.35
In light of the many protections that the Takeover Code affords
shareholders, it also restricts the actions of management in the face of a
bid for the company.36 The Board Neutrality Rule, a cornerstone of the
26
See generally CONNIE BRUCK, THE PREDATORS’ BALL: THE INSIDE STORY OF DREXEL
BURNHAM AND THE RISE OF THE JUNK BOND RAIDERS (Penguin Books 1989) (1988) (highlighting
Michael Milken’s career developing risky, and perhaps fraudent, schemes for financing corporate
takeovers); BRYAN BURROUGH & JOHN HELYAR, BARBARIANS AT THE GATE: THE FALL OF RJR
NABISCO (Harper Business 2008) (1990) (detailing the leveraged buyout of RJR Nabisco).
27
A two-tier front-end loaded tender offer, also called a “Saturday night special,” is a coercive
offer structure. Typically, the raider offers cash on a first-come, first-served basis for the first-tier
(the number of shares needed to obtain majority control) and subordinated notes for the second-tier
(the remaining shares). See Patrone, supra note 17.
28
See id. at 355.
29
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78 (2010) (as amended by the Williams
Act of 1968).
30
See generally MOIRA JOHNSTON, TAKEOVER (Beard Books 2000) (1986) (explaining the
hostile takeover process through the lens of three historic examples).
31
See, e.g., Takeover Code, supra note 3, § B(1).
32
Id. at r. 9.1(a); see also CONSULTATION PAPER, supra note 10, at 10 (citing the Takeover
Code, supra note 3, at § B(1), “if a person acquires control of a company, the other holders of
securities must be protected”). For the parallel provision in the European Union Directive on
Takeover Bids, see Council Directive 2004/25, art. 5, 2004 O.J. (L 142) 12, 17 (EC) [hereinafter
Directive].
33
Takeover Code, supra note 3, § C; see also Directive, supra note 32 (“The percentage of
voting rights which confers control . . . shall be determined by the rules of the Member State in
which the company has its registered office.”).
34
Companies Act, (2006), Vol. 3 CURRENT LAW 1, 804–19 (U.K.).
35
Takeover Code, supra note 3, §§ A(3), C(6).
36
E.g., id. at r. 21.1.
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U.K. takeover regime, prevents management from taking any frustrating
action when it has reason to believe that a bona fide bid for the company
is imminent.37 If management wishes to undertake such action, it can do
so only with advance approval of shareholders at a general meeting.38
Thus, U.K. companies cannot enact takeover defenses or engage in other
tactics that would prevent shareholders from considering a direct bid.39
Management’s role in this scenario is limited to communicating
information with shareholders, and is mandated by the Takeover Code to
express an informed opinion on the merits of the bid with the aid of
unbiased, independent advisors.40
In addition to its storied role in the United Kingdom, the Takeover
Code served as the model for the European Union Directive on Takeover
Bids (Directive), which includes such provisions as the aforementioned
mandatory bidding rule and the Board Neutrality Rule.41 Furthermore,
the Takeover Code’s General Principles are identical to those in the
Directive.42 The United Kingdom formally adopted the Directive by
virtue of the Companies Act of 2006, but this had little practical effect on
the rules that govern hostile takeovers in the United Kingdom since its
laws already contained most of the provisions.43
The Companies Act of 2006, in addition to providing a statutory
basis for the Takeover Code, gave the Takeover Panel a defined role and
statutory powers.44 The Takeover Panel was established by statute in
1968, along with the Takeover Code, as an independent body whose
membership is comprised of professionals appointed by governmental
bodies, non-governmental organizations, and the Takeover Panel itself.45
The Panel is charged with overseeing and regulating the transactions that
the Takeover Code governs, including the bidding process and mergers.46
The role of the Takeover Panel grew and strengthened in 2006 when it
became the regulatory authority that oversees and implements the
Directive in the United Kingdom, in addition to administering the
Takeover Code.47 As the regulatory watchdog on mergers and
acquisitions in the United Kingdom, the Takeover Panel has a powerful
voice with companies, the government, and the public, giving substantial
weight to its recommendations for changes to the Takeover Code.48

37

Id.
Id.
39
See id.; see also Patrone, supra note 17, at 356.
40
See CONSULTATION PAPER, supra note 10, at 66–67.
41
Directive, supra note 32, at art. 9; see also Takeover Code, supra note 3, § A(2)(b).
42
See Directive, supra note 32, at art. 3; Takeover Code, supra note 3, § A(2)(b).
43
See Companies Act, (2006), Vol. 3 CURRENT LAW 1, 804–48 (U.K.).
44
Takeover Code, supra note 3, § A(3); CONSULTATION PAPER, supra note 10, at 1–2.
45
Takeover Code, supra note 3, § A(4)(a); see also Panel Membership, THE TAKEOVER
PANEL, http://www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk/structure/panel-membership (last visited Dec. 5, 2011).
46
Takeover Code, supra note 3, § A(1); see also About the Panel, THE TAKEOVER PANEL,
http://www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk/structure/about-the-panel (last visited Dec. 5, 2011).
47
CONSULTATION PAPER, supra note 10, at 1–2.
48
E.g., Matthew Curtin, Evolution, Not Revolution, for U.K. Takeover Rules, WALL ST. J., Oct.
21, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240527023040238045755661 33711792398.html.
38
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THE TAKEOVER PANEL’S REVIEW OF THE TAKEOVER CODE AND
REVISED PHILOSOPHY

On February 24, 2010, the Takeover Panel announced the beginning
of its review of the Takeover Code, citing widespread public and
government criticism about the Takeover Code in light of Kraft’s
acquisition of Cadbury.49 The Takeover Panel’s review of the Takeover
Code is flawed because the Takeover Panel changed its focus from
shareholders to stakeholders, and it failed to perform enough research to
support its proposals. These flaws are evident in the Takeover Panel’s
reason for initiating the review, the review process itself, and the
conclusions of the review.
A. The Takeover Panel Lost Sight of its Focus to Protect Shareholders
The Takeover Panel reiterated the concern that the Takeover Code
fosters an environment where hostile bidders can too easily take control
of companies.50 Neither the mission of the Takeover Code nor the
governing general principles, however, lists protecting target companies
from hostile bidders as an objective of the takeover regime. The
Takeover Code identifies shareholders, not companies, as the
constituency that the Takeover Code seeks to protect.51 Despite the
Takeover Code’s focus on shareholders, the Takeover Panel never
suggests that the U.K. takeover regime disadvantages shareholders, and
never asserts that Cadbury’s shareholders did not receive adequate
protection from the Takeover Code, unless it was implying indirectly that
Kraft had misled Cadbury shareholders about its plan to move production
to Poland.52
As part of the Consultation Paper’s invitation for comments, the
Takeover Panel presented general statistics about company bids for the
four years leading up to the Takeover Panel’s review process.53 Of the
49

CONSULTATION PAPER, supra note 10, at 1–2.
Id. at 3–4.
51
See Takeover Code, supra note 3, §§ A(1)–A(2), B(1)–B(6).
52
See id.; CONSULTATION PAPER, supra note 10, at 3–4; TAKEOVER PANEL REPORT, supra
note 14, at 3.
53
CONSULTATION PAPER, supra note 10, at 4. The Takeover Panel provided the following data
for the four-year period in the United Kingdom ending Mar. 31, 2010:
Type of bid
Total
Percent of all bids
50

Formal offers for U.K. companies
Formal offers not initially recommended by
the target’s board
Formal offers still not recommended by the
target’s board when published
Formal
published
offers
still
not
recommended by the target’s board at the end
of the offer period
Successful offers not recommended by the
target’s board at the end of the offer period
Offers that lapsed at the end of the offer
period

472
72

15.25%

55

11.65%

40

8.47%

27

5.72%

13

2.75%
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472 offers made for U.K. companies during that period, the targets’
boards disapproved of only seventy-two (15%).54 Of these hostile offers,
shareholders approved only twenty-seven and the rest either lapsed or
turned into friendly negotiations such as Cadbury and Kraft.55 Thus, in
the four years prior to the Takeover Panel’s investigation, only 15% of
bids were true hostile offers, and of those, only 37.5% led to a takeover.56
Put differently, of the 472 offers made during a four-year span that
included a merger wave, only 6% were successful hostile bids—an
average of seven hostile takeovers per year.57 One would expect this
number to be higher in light of the blanket U.K. prohibition against
companies frustrating bids.58
Despite these statistics, and lack of any other empirical or statistical
evidence, the Code Committee concluded, in the Takeover Panel Report,
that it is too easy for hostile bidders to take over companies under the
current U.K. takeover regime, and that the Takeover Code puts
companies in a disadvantaged position, which is detrimental to
shareholders.59 The Code Committee cited the views of commentators
and respondents, but neither identified who these commentators and
respondents were nor explained their views in any detail other than the
general conclusion that companies have an unfair disadvantage to hostile
bidders.60 Further, the Code Committee failed to explain how a
disadvantage to companies is a de facto disadvantage to shareholders,
particularly in a context where companies’ and shareholders’ interests
can sharply diverge.61
After hastily concluding that the Takeover Code disproportionately
provides an advantage to hostile bidders, the Code Committee examined
the negative effects that this advantage has upon companies and their
employees, but not shareholders.62 These negative effects led the Code
Committee to suggest changes to the Takeover Code to alleviate the
perceived injustices.63 The Code Committee even listed the role of
shareholders under the Takeover Code as a factor that gives hostile
bidders a tactical advantage and has a negative effect on companies.64
This approach is troublesome because the Takeover Code’s mission is to
protect shareholders, not target companies and their employees.65

54

Id.
See id.
56
See id.
57
Id.
58
See Takeover Code, supra note 3, at r. 21; CONSULTATION PAPER, supra note 10, at 4.
59
TAKEOVER PANEL REPORT, supra note 14, at 3.
60
Id. The Code Committee did, however, list the names of the ninety-seven respondents who
did not comment on a confidential basis. Id. at 26.
61
Id.
62
Id. at 3, 8, 9, 10.
63
Id. at 10.
64
See id. at 4.
65
See Takeover Code, supra note 3, § A(2)(a) (stating that the purpose of the code is “to ensure
that shareholders are treated fairly and are not denied an opportunity to decide on the merits of a
takeover and that shareholders of the same class are afforded equivalent treatment by an offeror”).
55
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Further, the Code Committee’s aim at “redressing the balance in favour
of the offeree company”66 is misguided because it is facially outside the
scope of the Takeover Panel’s duties and it is substantively unclear
whether it will benefit shareholders.67
The Takeover Panel, as the agency that administers the Takeover
Code, was justified in its decision to conduct a review.68 The problems
with its review, however, begin with the manner in which it was
conducted. First, the Takeover Panel should have conducted a
meaningful study to determine whether hostile bidders are unduly
advantaged under the current U.K. takeover regime. Relying instead on
the views of commentators and respondents without citing any evidence
other than a list of factors is both arbitrary and capricious. As the
organization charged with protecting the interests of shareholders, the
Takeover Panel should have been more thorough and truly investigated
the effects of the current takeover regime instead of relying upon the
wave of polarized public opinion following the Cadbury/Kraft
acquisition.69
To improve its review process, the Takeover Panel could have
collected additional data on both hostile and friendly bids in the United
Kingdom and comparable jurisdictions to determine the U.K. takeover
regime’s effect on hostile bidders and companies.70 Such information as
acquisition premiums, bid conditions, and forms of consideration would
be very helpful in determining whether hostile bidders have an unfair
advantage in the United Kingdom and would have allowed the Code
Committee to conduct a more meaningful analysis. Data from the United
States would be helpful for comparison as well, as its takeover regime
allows target companies broad leeway to respond to unsolicited takeover
bids, including adopting takeover defenses and undertaking frustrating
action, so long as it is reasonable.71
B. The Takeover Code with the Board Neutrality Rule Appears to Have
Been Effective
The United Kingdom, by adopting the Board Neutrality Rule in the
Takeover Code and adopting the Directive, consciously decided to limit
the role of target company management in the face of a bid by leaving
the bulk of the responsibility and authority to target company
shareholders.72 It should come as no surprise then, that companies like
Cadbury must look to their shareholders to fend off a hostile takeover
66

TAKEOVER PANEL REPORT, supra note 14, at 3.
See Takeover Code, supra note 3, §§ A(2)(a), B(1)–B(6).
68
See Companies Act, (2006), Vol. 3 CURRENT LAW 1, 804-5 (U.K.).
69
See Takeover Code, supra note 3, § A(1).
70
The data contained in the Consultation Paper was a good start, but is insufficient to conduct a
meaningful statistical analysis on the effects of The Takeover Code on hostile bids. See
CONSULTATION PAPER, supra note 10, at 4. An empirical study on the issue would be very
worthwhile before the United Kingdom amends The Takeover Code.
71
E.g., Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 953–55 (Del. 1985).
72
See Takeover Code, supra note 3, at r. 21; Directive, supra note 32, at art. 9.
67
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and may only disseminate information and express an opinion on the bid
under the Takeover Code.73 Thus, it is misguided to argue that hostile
bidders have an unfair advantage over target companies because the
Takeover Code deliberately restrains target companies so that their
shareholders have the freedom to evaluate the merits of a bid for the
company and decide whether to accept or reject the offer.74 The focus of
the inquiry should instead be whether hostile bidders have an unfair
advantage over target company shareholders under the current U.K.
takeover regime.75 The Code Committee, unfortunately, never directly
made that distinction but instead concluded that the hostile bidder had an
advantage over the target company and therefore over company’s
shareholders.76
Second, the Takeover Panel should have investigated whether a
hostile bidder’s advantage actually has a negative effect on the
shareholders of target companies.77 Even if the Takeover Panel’s
investigation found that the current takeover regime makes it “too easy”
for hostile bidders to succeed, it is highly unlikely that the data would
show that this advantage has any meaningful impact on shareholders.
This conclusion naturally flows from the very Guiding Principles that the
Takeover Code is based upon—that all shareholders should be treated
equally and that target shareholders, not target companies, should be the
true decision makers in takeovers.78 Since a majority of shareholders
must approve any takeover, and the Takeover Code requires all
shareholders to receive equal consideration for their shares, it is hard to
imagine a situation where a hostile bidder’s advantage would negatively
affect shareholders, unless the shareholders felt a sentimental attachment
to their shares of the target company. The Takeover Code’s mandatory
bidding rules further bolster this position, as a hostile bidder can only
buy up to 29.9% of a company on the open market before having to
make a bid for the remainder of the shares at a fair price.79 Thus, the
protections of the Takeover Code probably negate any hostile bidder’s
advantage.
To evaluate whether a hostile bidder advantage indeed has a negative
effect on shareholders, the Takeover Panel could have utilized the same
data for acquisition premiums, bid conditions, and form of consideration
used to determine whether hostile bidders have an advantage.80 Further,
73

Takeover Code, supra note 3, at r. 21.
Id. §§ B(1)–B(3); see also id. at r. 21.
75
See id. § B.
76
See TAKEOVER PANEL REPORT, supra note 14, at 3 (“[T]he Code Committee has concluded
that hostile offerors have, in recent times, been able to obtain a tactical advantage over the offeree
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data from shareholder votes on solicited and unsolicited bids would be
helpful as well, as a narrow majority could indicate a negative effect on
shareholders when compared to offers that receive a substantial majority
of shareholder votes.81 Data from comparable regions and the United
States would also be helpful to put the report’s statistics in a meaningful
context.82 Without supporting evidence, however, the Takeover Panel
Code Committee’s hasty conclusion that hostile bidders have a tactical
advantage, and that this advantage negatively affects companies and
shareholders, threatens the integrity of the Takeover Code and its
Guiding Principles.83
In addition to conducting an insufficient review process, the Code
Committee misinterpreted and wrongly distorted the Takeover Code’s
philosophy and mission by taking it upon itself to protect the interests of
U.K. companies and employees rather than shareholders.84 The
Companies Act and Takeover Code clearly state that the Takeover
Panel’s objective is to ensure that shareholders have sufficient
information and free choice, not to help U.K. companies remain
independent.85 Companies have boards of directors and employees have
unions and labor officials to serve their interests; the Takeover Panel’s
duty is to protect shareholders.86
The Takeover Panel undoubtedly came under significant pressure
from both the public and government officials after Kraft’s acquisition of
Cadbury, but this pressure is misplaced on the Takeover Panel and
should instead be directed at Cadbury’s shareholders. Kraft’s hostileturned-friendly acquisition of Cadbury was a textbook example of the
U.K. takeover regime functioning properly: Kraft made a bid directly to
shareholders and the Cadbury board, after gauging shareholder
sentiment, negotiated a friendly merger with Kraft.87 Shareholders, not
the Takeover Panel, decided to accept Kraft’s proposal and facilitated the
sale of the British icon to a non-British company.88 Further, although
Kraft indicated that it was averse to job cuts in the United Kingdom,
layoffs are a common—if not expected—result of mergers and buyouts
as consolidating operations and eliminating duplicative functions are
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traditional means of achieving merger value.89 Cadbury shareholders, by
supporting Kraft’s acquisition proposal, may have decided that Kraft’s
offer price provided more value for their shares than the combination of
Cadbury’s inherent long-term value, its 186-year storied history, and the
additional jobs an independent Cadbury provides to the United
Kingdom.90 The report, however, failed to mention how much Kraft’s
assurances affected shareholder decision making. Thus, the public
criticism on the Takeover Code is misplaced and should instead focus on
target company shareholders—whose apparent values and priorities, as
evidenced by their actions, differ from those of the critics who support
U.K. takeover reform. If a majority of Cadbury shareholders wished for
Cadbury to remain independent and wished to keep jobs in the United
Kingdom, they would most likely have voted “no” on the merger
proposal and Kraft would not have acquired Cadbury. As company
shareholders and owners, however, they are free to sell their stakes as
they please.
As a foremost advocate for free markets, the United Kingdom
established a takeover regime that seeks to impose as little restraint as
possible—from either government or target companies—on both
solicited and unsolicited bids.91 The Takeover Panel, as an independent
regulatory agency, should be free from political pressures and economic
nationalism sentiment and should continue its focus on ensuring fair
treatment of shareholders, rather than shift course and seek to protect
U.K. companies and their employees as the Code Committee proposes.92
Economic nationalism and job losses, not shareholder disadvantages, are
the foundation of the public criticism surrounding the Cadbury/Kraft
acquisition.93 These interests are better left to other areas of law, like
labor and foreign investment, rather than takeover regulation.94 Instead of
caving under public pressure and heeding to the political winds, the
Takeover Panel and Code Committee should have reiterated its position
as an independent, unbiased, and objective regulator whose purpose is to
ensure the unprejudiced, fair treatment of shareholders.95 The Takeover
Panel Code Committee’s silently revised philosophy is without merit and
the Takeover Code should not adopt it.96
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THE TAKEOVER PANEL’S PROPOSALS WILL LIKELY HURT
SHAREHOLDERS

An analysis of the Takeover Panel’s proposals shows that some of
the proposals may fail to benefit and in fact may hurt the shareholders.
The first proposal changes the virtual bid period, and the second removes
deal protection measures and break fees.
A. The Virtual Bid Period Proposal
In the Takeover Panel Report, the Code Committee recommended
shortening the virtual bid period, placing additional requirements on
potential acquirers during and after the virtual bid period, and expanding
the list of triggers for the proposed four-week offer period.97 The Code
Committee believes that the existing virtual bid period gives offerors a
“tactical advantage,” stating that the “virtual bid period . . . can be long
and drawn-out and this can adversely affect the conduct of the offeree’s
business and the offeree company board’s negotiating position with an
offeror.”98 The Code Committee believes that the current Section D “put
up or shut up” regime is effective, but that a potential offeror can avoid
this regime by announcing “that it is considering making an offer but
without committing itself to doing so.”99 The Code Committee believes
that this leaves target companies “under siege” from unsolicited offerors
for prolonged periods of time, which prevents the company from
focusing on its normal business.100 This concern is somewhat ironic since
management operates the company’s business for the benefit of its
shareholders, but it is possible that a prolonged virtual bid period may
decrease productivity and therefore the enterprise and market value of
the company’s shares. It is curious, then, that the Code Committee did
not cite this concern and rather focused upon target companies’
management and employees as the intended beneficiaries of this rule.101
The Code Committee’s oversight, however, does not end with
protecting the incorrect constituencies from prolonged virtual bid
periods. To fix the perceived imbalance from virtual bid periods in favor
of offerors, the Code Committee recommended further regulating the bid
period, specifically amending the Takeover Code to require that an
announcement be made following an approach, naming the potential
offeror, which triggers the Section D “put up or shut up” period of the
Takeover Code.102 The Code Committee proposed a rule that allows
either the potential offeror or target to make the announcement.103 From
97
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the date of the announcement, the potential offeror will have twentyeight days to announce either a firm intention to make an offer, under
Rule 2.5, or that it will not make an offer and be subject to the Rule 2.8
six-month regulatory standstill period.104 The only exception to the
twenty-eight day period the Code Committee provides is if both the
offeror and offeree company jointly petition the Takeover Panel to
extend the timeline for good cause.105
While it is true that unsolicited acquisition interest can be disruptive
to a company’s operations, the Code Committee’s recommendations
focus on this tangential issue to the detriment of the underlying
acquisition process itself. Mergers, acquisitions, and potential takeovers
are, by nature, disruptive. The sale of a company is the most significant
and emotional point in its history.106 Thus, it is understandable that a
byproduct of the process may be a distraction from the target companies’
day-to-day activities, but to spite the entire process in the name of
partially alleviating one of the side effects is irrational and ultimately
harms the very constituency that the Takeover Panel is protecting—the
shareholders.107
First, the ability of the target company to unilaterally start the fourweek offer period gives the target company’s insiders—not
shareholders—undue leverage over a potential acquirer that can be
exploited for self-interest.108 Because the target company is not required
to share information with the potential offeror, the potential offeror must
operate without the data it may need to determine whether an offer for
the entire company is feasible. The potential offeror will have access to
publicly available information through other sources, but this alternative
due diligence process will inevitably take additional time. Thus, a target
company can put a potential acquirer at a substantial disadvantage by
triggering the start of the offer period and requiring the potential acquirer
to make an offer decision before it is ready to do so.109 Even if the
Takeover Code requires the company to show cause or some other
substantiation before it announces the identity of a potential offeror and
triggers the twenty-eight day offer period, ensuring that the potential
offeror or its agent did indeed approach the target, over-eager investment
bankers hunting for a deal or arbitrageurs fishing for tips could
104
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inadvertently satisfy this requirement.110 This also would be unfair to
potential offerors and place them at a tactical disadvantage that is not
justified by the minor “siege” the target company faces from a virtual bid
period.111
Second, even if the target company does not preemptively trigger the
start of the offer period, the four-week offer period still puts the potential
offeror at an undue disadvantage because, unlike in friendly negotiations,
the potential offeror is not guaranteed access to the target’s nonpublic
information before or during the offer period, and the Takeover Panel
Report makes no recommendations for allowing potential offerors access
to this information.112 Thus, a potential offeror will be burdened in its
due diligence process when deciding whether to make an offer, and may
not be able to make the determination at the end of the four-week period.
Because companies are only required to make public filings at certain
intervals, a target company can strategically time its information releases
to frustrate the potential offeror’s due diligence process and ensure that
the information needed to determine whether an offer is financially
feasible is unavailable.
Because the Code Committee’s proposed changes only provide for
an exception to the four-week period if both the potential offeror and
target company jointly petition the Takeover Panel, the Code
Committee’s proposal to shorten the virtual bid period is likely to result
in three different outcomes, none of which benefit the shareholders of
target companies. First, companies who are not prepared to decide
whether to make a bid at the end of the four-week period are more likely
not to make offers and be subject to the six-month regulatory standstill
period. Because potential acquirers will always bid higher than the
current market price for all of the target company’s shares, shareholders
will lose this opportunity to realize more value for their shares.113
Second, potential offerors who have been rushed in their decisionmaking processes but decide to still make bids will adjust for the increase
in uncertainty and risk by offering less for the targets’ shares to
compensate for the higher risk premium.114 This is unfortunate for
shareholders of target companies because potential acquirers presumably
would offer more per share if they had additional time to complete their
due diligence, which ultimately results in target company shareholders
110
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realizing less value for their shares. Finally, potential acquirers may
make highly conditional offers or later withdraw their offers upon
learning new information.115 This is also a terrible scenario for target
companies and target company shareholders because other investors will
see the targets as damaged goods and the target’s shares are likely to
decline in market value.
It is important to note that the primary constituency for the Takeover
Panel is shareholders, but the Code Committee failed to present any
evidence or arguments that indicate that a shortened offer period benefits
shareholders.116 Additionally, only two potential counterarguments were
presented in the initial Consultation Paper: (1) that the target company
“is only truly under ‘siege’ . . . once the fact of the potential offeror’s
approach has been publicly disclosed and an offer period has
commenced,” and (2) the target company can “resolve the situation by
publicly disclosing the potential offeror’s existence and identity and
seeking a ‘put up or shut up’ deadline from the Panel immediately
thereafter.”117 Foremost, these potential counterarguments do not address
the issues facing shareholders. Further, these counterarguments were not
even addressed by the Takeover Panel Report.118 Before accepting the
premises that (1) the virtual bid period places an undue burden on target
companies by subjecting them to being “under siege” for prolonged
periods, and (2) this “siege” is detrimental to shareholders of target
companies, the Code Committee should have conducted a meaningful
study and gathered empirical data to establish or rebut the validity of
these concerns.119 Instead, the Code Committee wrongly accepted these
two assertions as given and used them as the basis for its first proposed
amendment to the Takeover Code.120
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B. The Proposal to Prohibit Deal Protection Measures and Break Fees
The Code Committee’s second proposed amendment in the Takeover
Panel Report is for the Takeover Code to impose a general prohibition on
deal protection measures and inducement fees “strengthening the
position of the offeree company.”121 As with the virtual bid period, the
Code Committee made this recommendation without conducting any
empirical studies or collecting any data whatsoever on deal protection
measures and inducement fees.122 Further, the majority of comments that
the Code Committee received favored allowing, but further regulating,
inducement fees so long as they are de minimis (generally capped at 1%
of the offer price), as well as deal protection measures.123 Thus, the
Takeover Panel Report’s recommendation has neither the support of data
nor public sentiment, and the Code Committee instead rests its argument
solely upon its own arbitrary conclusion that these measures lead to
fewer competing offers and less favorable terms for competing offers,
citing only the “Panel Executive’s experience of current market
practice.”124 The Code Committee also proposed that there should be an
exception to this prohibition of inducement fees and deal protection
measures in the limited situation where a target undertakes a formal,
public auction process to sell the company.125
The Code Committee asserted that it needs to prohibit deal
protection measures and inducement fees, rather than leave potential
offerors and target companies to bargain over such matters in the free
market, because the Code Committee believes that target companies are
at a substantial disadvantage and cannot negotiate with offerors at arm’s
length.126 The Code Committee further believes that it has become
common practice for offerors to insist on the highest allowable
inducement fees and maximum permissible deal protection measures,
despite the absence of any supporting data.127 Assuming, arguendo, that
the Code Committee made a genuine factual finding on the issue and was
concerned about unduly burdensome inducement fees and deal protection
measures, why not simply recommend reducing the maximum allowable
inducement fee and restricting allowable deal protection measures
instead of banning them altogether?128 Further, if these measures are so
detrimental to target companies and their shareholders, why does the
Takeover Panel Report recommend an exception to the prohibition for
public auctions of companies?129
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The Takeover Panel Report’s approach to inducement fees,
commonly referred to as “break fees” or “termination fees” in the United
States,130 is misguided and ultimately deprives target company
shareholders from realizing the full value of their shares. Inducement
fees are generally only payable after specific triggering events—usually
the target board recommending a competing offer after entering into an
acquisition agreement with the offeror.131 Currently, inducement fees are
permissible under the Takeover Code so long as (1) they are de minimis
(usually capped at 1% of the offer price), and (2) the target company
confirms to the Takeover Panel that it believes the inducement fee is in
its shareholders’ best interests.132 The Code Committee offered no
evidence, however, to show that this regime unduly disadvantages target
companies.133 Instead, the Takeover Panel Report arbitrarily relies on the
argument in the Consultation Paper that inducement fees “may lead to a
reduction in shareholders’ funds . . . without any clear benefit being
obtained by offeree company shareholders.”134
In addition to not providing any evidence on inducement fees, the
Code Committee failed to respond to any counterarguments to its
position in the Takeover Panel Report.135 The sole argument that the
Takeover Panel introduced in favor of inducement fees, that an offeror
may not be willing to make an offer in the absence of an inducement fee,
was only addressed in the initial Consultation Paper and only focuses on
a narrow area of potential offers.136 While the absence of inducement
fees may indeed dissuade potential offerors from making offers in certain
instances, the argument fails to capture the larger picture of how
inducement fees can provide value to offerors and shareholders alike. It
is well established, and can be partially inferred from the Consultation
Paper’s potential counterargument, that conducting due diligence and
entering into an agreement to purchase a company is both time
consuming and expensive for potential offerors. These costs must be
accounted for by the offeror, and are often defrayed by the use of
inducement fees in the event that the deal falls apart. Thus, if the
Takeover Panel bans inducement fees, two outcomes are likely, and both
are worse for target company shareholders than the current regime. First,
130
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as the Consultation Paper suggests, there will likely be fewer offers for
companies.137 This is because offerors may identify targets they can
acquire for attractive prices, but may be unable to afford their own offerrelated costs for any one or more of three reasons: the deal falls apart,
management revises its stance and instead recommends another offer, or
shareholders vote against the proposed deal.
Alternatively, potential acquirers are likely to offer lower prices for
target companies if the Takeover Code bans inducement fees. This can
be explained through the two essential prongs of an offer: price and
certainty.138 Inducement fees both increase the likelihood that the target’s
shareholders will approve the agreed-upon acquisition and that the
potential acquirer will be reimbursed for part of its expenses if the deal
falls apart. In an efficient market, which the United Kingdom strives to
maintain, this increase in certainty—and corresponding decrease in
risk—will be of considerable value to the potential acquirer and
accordingly something for which the potential acquirer will increase its
bid. Although the risk of paying the inducement fee if the deal is not
consummated still exists for shareholders, this risk will be overshadowed
in the long-run by the number of deals that will be completed at higher
prices per share.139
Other deal protection measures, in addition to inducement fees,
similarly add value to a merger transaction and can be both valuable and
beneficial to target company shareholders. The Code Committee failed to
recognize this point, and instead recommended that the Takeover Code
ban other deal protection measures as well, with very few exceptions.
Notably, the Consultation Paper focused on exclusive inducement fee
agreements, non-solicitation (or “no shop”) agreements, notification
agreements, “matching rights” (or “topping rights”), confidentiality
agreements, and “force the vote provisions.”140 The Consultation Paper
presented the counterargument, in favor of deal protection measures, that
these measures are subject to the target company board’s fiduciary
duties.141 This creates a “fiduciary out,” but the Consultation Paper
ultimately dismissed this point because it is likely to result in litigation
over whether specific actions are proper discharges of fiduciary duties,
which disadvantages target companies.142 The Code Committee
addressed these measures in the same breath as inducement fees, and
recommended a general prohibition against their use. The prohibition
came with the following limited exceptions: instances where a company
137
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initiates a formal, public auction process to sell itself,143 confidentiality
agreements for sensitive information provided during the offer process,
non-solicitation agreements for the offeror’s customers or employees,
and agreements to provide information necessary for regulatory
approvals.144
Once again, the Code Committee failed to provide any evidence or
data to support its assertion that deal protection measures unduly harm
target company shareholders and recommended that the Takeover Code
be amended to impose a general ban on these measures.145 While these
measures may be restrictive on target companies and preclude target
company shareholders from certain opportunities, they provide a great
deal of certainty for offerors, for which offerors will compensate these
shareholders. The Takeover Panel Report neither raised nor addressed
this argument, which is unfortunate because the proposed amendment
destroys this value for both potential offerors and target company
shareholders. Similar to the ban on inducement fees, this Takeover Code
amendment is likely to lead to fewer offers and lower offers for target
companies, which ultimately deprives target company shareholders from
realizing the full value of their shares.
The Takeover Panel Report and Consultation Paper focus a great
deal on target companies not being able to bargain at arm’s length for
inducement fee arrangements and deal protection measures, asserting
that these have become standardized in the market.146 If this were truly
the case, a more appropriate means of regulation would be to put target
companies in arm’s length bargaining positions with potential offerors
rather than ban practices that generate value for which acquirers are
willing to pay. The Takeover Panel Report’s proposal, however, takes an
overly paternalistic approach in its recommendation to prohibit these
devices altogether—an approach under which there are no discernible
winners and many losers, namely, shareholders.
AN ALTERNATIVE PROPOSAL – ABOLISH THE BOARD NEUTRALITY
RULE

V.

Even if the Takeover Panel meant to protect all stakeholders’
interests, the Panel failed to identify a proposal that would potentially
serve the stakeholders better—that is, to abolish the Board Neutrality
Rule. The Code Committee now believes that the Takeover Code,
including the Board Neutrality Rule, places companies at a substantial
disadvantage to bidders and that the takeover framework should not
unduly favor particular parties.147 To fix this perceived shortfall in the
takeover framework, though, the Code Committee advocates making the
143
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process more difficult for would-be acquirers.148 This approach does not
make sense and is not consistent with the Takeover Code General
Principles.149 Assuming, arguendo, that the current takeover framework
does indeed place companies at a substantial disadvantage,150 why not
alleviate this disadvantage by changing how the Takeover Code regulates
target companies in the face of a hostile bid? Why is the United
Kingdom so married to the idea of the Board Neutrality Rule if its own
takeover watchdog unequivocally states that it places companies at a
disadvantage?151
Within the Takeover Panel Report, there has been a significant shift
in intended beneficiaries of the U.K. takeover regime, from the Code
Committee’s perspective.152 The Board Neutrality Rule originally
protected shareholders and still exists to serve their interests and ensure
that they can exercise meaningful choice when evaluating a friendly or
hostile bid.153 In making its proposals, however, the Takeover Panel
Code Committee never substantively argued that the Board Neutrality
Rule now disadvantages shareholders; it only argued that the rule
disadvantages companies.154 In order to rectify the situation, the Code
Committee proposed that bidders and companies should both be
disadvantaged for the takeover framework to fulfill its goal of serving
shareholders.155 The confusion does not stop there, however, because the
Code Committee did not substantively argue that these proposals are
designed to benefit shareholders, but other stakeholders—namely,
employees.156 The current framework under the Takeover Code is
designed for the benefit of the shareholders, but it unduly disadvantages
companies. If the Takeover Panel Report’s proposals pass, the
framework will equally disadvantage would-be acquirers and bidders,
just to protect stakeholders the framework should not protect.157
In order to best address the concerns introduced by the Code
Committee, the United Kingdom would be better off abolishing the
Board Neutrality Rule than implementing the Code Committee’s
recommended changes. The Board Neutrality Rule, strictly implemented,
benefits shareholders because it guarantees they can consider a bid for
the company without management taking defensive action to frustrate the
bid.158 Presumably, this will generate higher bids for shareholders
because hostile bidders do not have to account for the cost of
management’s frustrating actions, takeover defenses, or waging a
148
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takeover battle into the bid price. Although some distinguished
practitioners argue that forcing a bidder to deal with the board is the best
way to maximize shareholder value,159 others argue that, in the simple
context of a direct bid to shareholders, a rational bidder would bid a
higher price if he did not have to expend resources to overcome
resistance or finance a takeover battle.160
This simple example changes, however, when the Takeover Panel’s
proposed amendments to the Takeover Code enter into the equation.161
At this point, it is unclear whether the Board Neutrality Rule and the
Takeover Panel’s new proposals for bidders or a regime like Delaware’s,
where bidders may negotiate with management,162 will more effectively
maximize shareholder value.163 From a strategic standpoint, however,
one would presume that a would-be bidder would place a premium on
being subject to fewer government regulations and higher deal certainty.
Additionally, from a public policy standpoint, it seems far more desirable
to have a takeover framework where bidders and companies are able to
utilize all of their resources and act in their highest capacity.164 A
potential takeover, whether successful or not, is a very disruptive and
significant point in a company’s history,165 so the Panel’s reasoning for
recommending the new proposals is irrelevant. Therefore, leaving both
the would-be acquirer and target company to utilize their business
judgment and all available tools is the most desirable way for the
takeover regime to govern this situation. Under the Takeover Code and
the Takeover Panel’s proposed changes, however, the situation is akin to
sending two men out to duel with slingshots rather than guns.
Further, the Takeover Panel subtly suggests an enlarged group of
Takeover Code beneficiaries by stating that the Takeover Code should
“take more account of the position of persons who are affected by

159
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takeovers in addition to offeree company shareholders.”166 If the
Takeover Panel is serious about this goal, abolishing the Board
Neutrality Rule would be a better approach to protecting non-shareholder
stakeholders than recommending additional regulations. The best way to
protect these interests is to allow company management to exercise its
business judgment when evaluating takeover proposals and determining
an appropriate response, which may include undertaking actions to
frustrate the bid.167
After serving as the model for board neutrality in the Directive, there
has been changing sentiment in the United Kingdom about company law.
The Code Committee is taking a much more pro-company approach to
the takeover regime, yet maintains that the current regime need only be
altered to alleviate its disproportionate effect on companies and,
indirectly, employees.168 It is understandable that the United Kingdom
would not advocate for repealing the Board Neutrality Rule given its
heritage and role as model for the Directive.169 Thus, deeming the Board
Neutrality Rule unfair and repealing it would be detrimental—if not
catastrophic—to the efforts to uniformly implement the newly-passed
Directive, specifically Article 9 on board neutrality. From a practical
standpoint, repealing the Board Neutrality Rule so that companies could
engage in takeover defense activities could be the best way to protect
both shareholders and stakeholders. The Takeover Panel, as an
independent agency free from the political process, should consider this
proposal as a means of alleviating the negative effects a hostile-bidder’s
advantage has upon target company shareholders—if such negative
effects exist.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Throughout the Consultation Paper and the Takeover Panel Report,
the Takeover Panel and Code Committee repeatedly suggest that boards
of target companies either cannot or will not represent and protect their
shareholders’ interests in the United Kingdom’s free market.
Accordingly, the Takeover Panel believes that the Takeover Code should
be less permissive and more paternalistic in order to ensure that
shareholders’ interests are served. Sadly, this approach ignores the
fiduciary and representative relationship that company directors share
with their shareholders. If directors are unwilling to represent and serve
the interests of shareholders, then shareholders will exercise their voting
rights and elect new directors who will. If directors are unable to defend
or serve shareholders’ interests, then shareholders will do so themselves
by adopting provisions to strengthen their companies and by instructing
166
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their directors to take additional measures and seek assistance. If offerors
try to coerce or take advantage of shareholders, then shareholders will
simply vote against the offerors and continue to enjoy the liberties and
protections of the Takeover Code and the shareholder democracy
philosophy.
Unfortunately, these proposed amendments are not about
shareholders at all, even if they pretend to be. The Takeover Code allows
target companies to protect their shareholders and ensures that
shareholders can protect themselves. The Takeover Code does not,
however, allow target companies to protect their employees, their
national heritage, or themselves at the expense of shareholders.
Regrettably, these ideals are what the proposed amendments aim to
achieve, even though many other areas of law already address them. The
Takeover Panel, the world’s oldest institution on mergers and
acquisitions, simply could not maintain its independence in the face of
immense public outcry and government pressure. It did not want to bear
the blame for allowing British icons to be swallowed by foreign
corporate giants and for allowing U.K. jobs to be shipped overseas. So,
although the Takeover Panel’s post-Cadbury proposal will serve many
constituencies if adopted, it will harm the group that needs the Takeover
Code’s protection most: the shareholders.
This article raises more questions than it answers, but it is better to
examine the law thoroughly and to carefully consider alternatives than to
rush to legislate after an undesirable event occurs. Emotion and rhetoric
are no substitutes for data and evidence, and the desire to eliminate all
potentially negative side effects of a hostile takeover cannot overshadow
the importance of a well-founded body of takeover law. Perhaps the
Takeover Panel’s recommendations will ultimately benefit shareholders,
but there is no way to know without further research, and thus the
Takeover Panel should conduct more research before enacting its
proposals.
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